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NOTES
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE FOR THE
DEVILS LAKE INDIAN RESERVATION
I. OBJECTIVES OF DOMESTIC LAW
If a law is made in answer to the call for protection, in the
case of domestic law it is necessary to determine how laws concern-
ing the creation and destruction of the marital relationship can best
offer protection to the family. Before an attempt can be made to
offer such protection, it must be shown that the family merits
or is in need of this special attention. That is, does the family serve
a legitimate function in our society?
The family has been given many functional definitions, each
regarding it to be of different value. The sociologist feels that "[I]t
is almost axiomatic that the family is a universally necessary social
institution. . . ."' The family, in the eyes of the law "is essential
to the evolution and growth of a viable society .... Family, like law
itself, is one of the basic processes for the control of human behavior.
... Thus perceived, the law shapes and is shaped by the family."
Mr. Justice Traynor, in DeBurgh v. DeBurgh,3 stated:
The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of
the personal affections that ennoble and enrich human life.
It channels biological drives that might otherwise become
socially destructive; it ensures the care and education of chil-
dren in a stable environment; it establishes continuity from
one generation to another; it nurtures and develops the indi-
vidual initiative that distinguishes a free people. Since the
family is the core of our society, the law seeks to foster and
preserve marriage.
4
1. B. MOORE, JR., POLITICAL POWER AND SOCiL THEORY, 160 (1960), Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
2. J. GoLDsTE AND J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW, 1 (1965).
3. DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
4. Id. at 863-64, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952).
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The effects of marriage failure are felt by all. The social
and economic cost is apparent in that it spawns juvenile delinquency,
disturbs mental and physical health and affects school, industry and
business. As an example, the cost of desertion by the husband
and father is $1.5 billion yearly in Aid to Dependent Children.,
Indeed, if the family is so basic to our social, economic, political
systems, the state has a valid interest in protecting this institution
as a matter of self-preservation. By fostering family stability the
state nurtures one of the basic elements from which it derives
its strength and effectiveness. It is the state's interest in family
stability which allows the law to create, maintain, or destroy the
biological, social, economic and ethical relationships that are the
family.
The interest of the state in marriage stability as it is effectuated
by the law must not, however, become too commanding. "[A]I1
legislation regarding private and personal arrangements must follow
a policy of minimum state intervention consistent with the state's
overall goals. It must respect the privacy and integrity of the mar-
riage relationship and of all the individuals involved.",
If the family is desirable and the state has a legitimate interest
therein, the goal of domestic legislation should be to promote greater
family stability. However, in order to create laws that are effective
in decreasing the instability of marriage, it is essential that some-
thing be known about the causes of this instability. Unfortunately,
very little is actually known about the reasons -for marriage break-
down and opinions based only on inadequate data are available.
7
Modern developments have brought about a great change in
the nature of the modern marriage. Whereas in earlier times the
role of the family was largely economic, this income-producing task
is today performed primarily outside the home. Such developments
tend to create new roles for the modern family. The satisfying of
personal needs through the relationship of the family has become
much more important.8 On this basis many psychologists believe
that marriage dissolutions result from failure to satisfy each other's
unconscious neurotic needs.9 Equally as often however, economic,
political, social class and role factors are emphasized. 1°
5. Foster, Coniliation and Counseling in the Courts in Family Law Cases, 41 N.Y.U.
LAW Rgv. 353 (1966).
6. Goldstein and Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model Statute and
Commentary, 3 FAMILY L. Q. 75, 84-85 (1969). [Hereinafter cited as Goldstein and Git-
ter].
7. R. J. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALY-
sis, 72-75 (prepared for the Special Committee on Divorce of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). [Hereinafter cited as Levy].
8. Tenney, Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24, 49 (1967).
9. C. FooTE, R. LEVY AND F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw, 785-86
(1966). [Hereinafter cited as Foote, Levy and Sander].
10. Foster and Freed, Unequal Protection: Poverty and Family Law, 42 IND. L. J. 192,
194-96 (1966).
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[M]arital instability seems to be disproportionately re-
lated to: (1) youth at marriage; (2) low educational attain-
ment; (3) low occupational status of one spouse or both
spouses; (4) both spouses being members of the upper class
on the one hand, or the "working" or "lower" class, on the
other; (5) poverty; (6) remarriage .... These factors seem
to interact in a great many ways; to try to isolate any one
of them .. .would be extremely difficult at best.1
This lack of knowledge as to the causes of marriage breakdown
does not mean that domestic law can't be effective in preserving
the marital relationship. "Social policy, it is true, often determines
or redefines what the law shall be, but sometimes the law itself
clarifies or sets the norms of conduct for members of the society,
and thereby sets social policy."' 12 Thus, by stressing stability in
the marriage relationship, domestic law may establish society's atti-
tude and encourage such stability.
Domestic law has traditionally been of the preventative or re-
strictive type. What is needed, however, is legislation of a more
positive kind. The state can do something to promote conditions more
favorable to successful marriages by doing such things as establish-
ing programs of sex education and by improving economic and
social conditions making married life more tolerable.'3
Such remedial measures, however, can be of only limited effec-
tiveness without state uniformity of domestic law. Reform is not
enough, there must also be uniformity.4 The necessary uniformity
will probably be slow in coming however, and steps toward reform
made individually but in a uniform direction will be valuable in
achieving the desired end.
II. THE INDIAN PROBLEM
The status of the Indian in the law has been obscured by the
divided obligation of the Indian to the tribe, to state, and to the
national government. Reciprocally, the obligation of the tribe, state
and national government to the Indian has been equally uncertain.
This triple governmental arrangement-tribe, state, and nation-has
resulted in divided responsibility which has been both inefficient
and ineffective. 15
The jurisdictional problem which exists with regard to domestic
law, however, is probably no worse than that which exists between
11. Levy at 76.
12. Monahan, State Legislation and Control of Marriage, 2 J. FAMILY L. 30 (1962).
13. Hammer, Divorce Reform in California; The Governor's Commission on the Family
and Beyond, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 32, 36 (1968). [Hereinafter cited as Hammer].
14. Levy at 9-12.
15. HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SUnCOMMITTEN ON INDIAN AF-
FAIRS, 82d Cong.. 2d Sess. 44 (1952).
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any two states. Title 25, section 11.28 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions provides: "[T]he Tribal Council shall have authority to de-
termine ... what shall constitute . . . marriage and divorce ... "I'
The problem of the Indian under the law is greatly complicated
by cultural, economic, social and educational conditions. The Indian
culture is in a state of transition brought about by the drastic
change in social and economic conditions. The productive potential
of the reservation land is not sufficient to sustain the entire Indian
population. This makes it necessary for many Indians to leave the
reservation in search of employment, a step which most will not
take because it forces the severance of family ties. The Indian
possesses no particular skill, so any job he does find is primarily
of the unskilled type and usually seasonal. This all results in an
extremely low income." A survey of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux,
the major tribe on the Devils Lake Reservation, showed a 75% de-
pendence on welfare, either state or federal. The survey points out
that, on the average, these Indian families have only about 20% of
the income per person that the average American family receives.18
The Indian suffers also from an inadequacy of education. This
is due largely to their poverty but is added to by migratory living,
lack of motivation, lack of facilities, language barriers, and segre-
gation.19
The Indian is often confused when confronted with the white
man's law.20 To help prevent such confusion, any Indian legislation
should be written in readily-understood, non-technical language. This
is important also to the success of the local informal judicial system
in which capable members of the tribe with no legal training partici-
pate as Associate Judges.
The Indian problem is very complex, but its primary manifestation
is in poverty. Although it is probably not wise to treat only the
symptoms, legislation aimed at easing problems brought on by pov-
erty may reduce the pressure so that the cause may eventually
be eliminated.
III. MARRIAGE
A. The Goal of Marriage Law
"Any inquiry into the adequacy of present domestic legislation
might well begin with marriage laws and procedures, since many
divorces are but the severing of ties that never should have been
16. 26 C.F.R. § 11.28 (1969).
17. FARBER, O'DEAN AND TscHETTER, INDIANS, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LOCAL GOVERN-
mzNT, 11 (June, 1957), Report No. 37, S. Dak. St. Univ. Governmental Research Bureau).
18. Id. at 12.
19. North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission, Report No. 4, 9-10 (October, 1956).
20. Farber, O'Dean and Tschetter, supra note 17, at 77.
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made in the first place. ' 21 Marriage is the creation of the legally
protected family relationship; quite naturally regulation of what
relationships are created will affect their stability and the degree
of state intervention that will be necessary for their preservation.
The most easily implemented state control over family creation
is of the licensing type whereby marriage is permitted only if certain
requirements are met. As a result, marriage legislation is largely
preventative. 22 For example, age restrictions are designed to ensure
that the parties possess sufficient maturity to enter into a successful,
lasting marriage, and waiting periods are aimed at reducing the
number of marriages hastily entered into.
Marital legislation of this type presupposes an understanding
of the causes of marriage failure; this assumption is not valid to
any substantial degree. Although some general causes of marital
instability are known and preventative measures may be effective
to some degree, any harsh restrictions probably prevent at least
as many happy as unhappy marriages.23 Moreover, because of their
preventative nature, marriage laws-in particular, licensing statutes-
have an effectiveness of relatively short duration. "Where there
has been a violation of a preventative policy which was undetected
in time to prevent a marriage and the creation of a family, it
is usually too late for the prevention to be effective as to that
particular family."' 4
Preventative or restrictive measures can be effective but they
must be supplemented by more positive legislation. What is really
needed is broad educational, economic, and social programs whereby
conditions can be made more favorable to effective legislation.25
B. The Indian Marriage Problem
t In the area of marriage law there is no severe problem peculiar
to the Devils Lake Indian Reservation that calls for drastic reform;
they merely need marriage law included in their code. Their code,
as it stands now, has adopted relevant North Dakota domestic
law by reference. This is inadequate primarily in that the Tribal
Court possesses no authority to issue marriage licenses or perform
marriage ceremonies. At present a couple must go off the reservation
to the County Court to obtain a license. If the tribe is to succeed in
becoming an independent, self-governing body, it must have express-
ed in its own code adequate self-regulatory power, including the
power to create a marital realtionship.
21. Note, The Notional TragedV of Divorce, 30 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 180, 181-82 (1947).
22. See Levy at Append. D, 1-10.
28. Hammer at 35-86.
24. Foote, Levy and Sander at 179.
25. Hammer at 36.
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C. Marriage Law Provisions
1. Age Requirements
"The assumption that youthful marriages are particularly suscep-
tible to divorce has general support from public attitude and most
sociologists and authors." 26 For this reason minimum age require-
merits attempt to promote marriage stability by aiming at preventing
hasty and immature marriages.
There is some evidence that youth marriages are less
stable than marriages contracted when the spouses are older;
there seems little doubt that a disproportional percentage of
youth marriages are migratory, and in a disproportional per-
centage of youth marriages the girl is pregnant. . . . [V] ery
little is as yet known as to whether youth alone can be con-
sidered responsible for the observed instability of youth mar-
riages.
21
Whatever the causes, there seems to be a high probability
of divorce for the very youthful marriage and age requirements
may eliminate this instability to some degree. 28
Application of such a restriction in too harsh a manner however,
stands a chance of preventing sound as well as unstable marriages.
To meet this possibility, the provision -for judicial discretion in age
requirements seems advisable in view of the fact that migratory
marriage and "the establishment of an informal family relationship
are alternatives for the couple.
29
2. Premarital :Counseling
It seems -to be quite generally agreed that -many of the causes
of marital instability may be abolished by a broad program of
family life education through which preparation for marriage would
begin before the decision to marry has been made. 30 Until such
a program can be implemented, and as a useful supplement to it,
premarital counseling would be of the following benefit:
(1) Couples in situations in which a marriage would
seem inadvisable could be helped to rethink their deci-
sion....
(2) When the marriage is brought about by pregnancy
the real motive could be established. ...
26. Monahan, Does Age at Marriage Matter in Divorce? 32 SOCIAL FORCES 81, 82
(1953) .(Hereinafter cited as Monahan].
27. Levy at 23-24.
28. Monahan at 84-85.
29. Levy at 26.
30. See Furlong, Youthful Marriage and Parenthood: A Threat to Family Stability, 19
HASTINGS L. J. 105, 117-53 (1967).
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(3) Those couples who have thought through their po-
sition and approach marriage in a positive manner may be
helped to avoid pitfalls, establish communications and ad-
vance toward a wholesome relationship.
(4) A relationship would be established with a marriage
counselor which would make it possible for the couple to return
early enough to be helped at any future time of friction.
(5) It would provide an unbiased third party to help
them meet realistically their situation apart from the preju-
dices of friends and relatives.31
3. Waiting Period
An apparent correlation has been found between marriages hastily
entered into which disregard waiting period requirements and a high
divorce rate. 32 With regard to this instability "[t]here is no doubt
that imposition of some waiting period does in fact prevent some
very hasty marriages which the parties may regret." 33 Even a short
waiting period tends to eliminate marriages that result from dares,
jokes, intoxication and short-run sexual desire.
3 '
When a couple is denied a license to marry by the local authority,
they often resort to the alternative of going to a neighboring state
under whose laws they qualify. Waiting period provisions in many
of these states have tended to decrease such migratory marriages. 85
4. Prohibition of Incestuous Marriage
As to the possible harm of an incestuous marriage, "[g]eneti-
cists agree generally that the only effect upon offspring would be
an increased chance of transmitting any disease or weakness which
already existed in the blood line. Such incestuous relationships may
be treated not as biologically harmful but only as sociologically
improper." 36
The prohibition of marriage between marital relatives has little
logical support. The concept grew out of the religious notion that
husband and wife become one flesh and blood. Today the reasons
of genetic and social policy which support continuation of consanguin-
ity as a bar to marriage do not support affinity as such an impedi-
ment.3 7 Furthermore, most authorities agree that there is no social
or engenic justification for prohibition of first cousin marriages.38
31. Id. at 131-33.
82. Foote, Levy and Sander at 237.
83. Levy at 26.
34. Monahan, State Legislation and Control of Marriage, 2 J. FAMILY L. 30, 36 (1962).
35. Foote, Levy and Sander at 264.
36. Bucca v. State, 43 N.J. SUPER. 315, 321, 128 A.2d 506, 510 (Ch. 1957).
37. Foote, Levy and Sander at 211.
38. See, e.g., Moore, A Defense of First Cousin Marriage, 10 CLzv. MAR. L. REv. 136
(1961).
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5. Inclusion of Annulment with Divorce
Quite frequently annulment is used as no more than another
technique for avoiding a marriage which has failed or been found
unsatisfactory, on the basis of some technical impediment. The Cali-
fornia Governor's Commission on the Family was "convinced that
the essential question presented in the annulment of a voidable
marriage does not differ from that presented in any dissolution of
marriage case," and they recommended "the removal of the annul-
ment of voidable marriages as a separate form of action and the
coalescence of all dissolution proceedings . . . into a single form of
action governed by a single standard." 39
The annulment concept is an historical idiosyncrasy
which, for good reason, has not been able to maintain even
conceptual integrity; the void-voidable dichotomy introduces
needless interstate complexity and . . . substantial hardships
have been visited on individual spouses and on the children
of what may have been for all other purposes stable family
relationships."0
Granted, the state has an interest in the validity of marriage but
it has no unique interest in preserving the distinction between mar-
riage validity and divorce.4'1
As a method of eliminating the void-voidable distinction by which
some of the grounds for an annulment action could be preserved,
annulment should be limited to situations in which the marriage is
deemed initially invalid by specific statute and in which the grounds
for annulment are easily ascertainable.
42
IV. DIVORCE
A. The Goal of Divorce Law
A good divorce law should seek to strengthen the stability of
marriage 4 3 but once a marriage has broken down and is no longer
functional, the state's problem is no longer marriage stability but
dissolving a marriage fairly, without bitterness, distress or humili-
ation and safeguarding the rights of the parties by regularizing
procedure in the interests of an orderly society.4 4 The solution to
this problem does not lie in making divorce more difficult.
A suggested guide for divorce legislation has stated that a divorce
statute must:
39. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, 35-36 (1966).
40. Levy at 17.
41. Id. at 18.
42. Goldstein and Gitter at 97.
43. Levy at 83.
44. Lichtenberger, Divorce Legislatiton, 160 ANNALS 116 (1932).
45. See Foote, Levy and Sander, "A Quadrllogue on Divorce Policy," 769-95.
NOTES
[LIeave the decision to divorce or remain married
with the adults involved [and] acknowledge the inability of
the law to order highly personal human relationships ...
[P]rotect the parties from coerced decisions [by] safe-
guard[ing] the interests of the children, and provid[ing]
the adult partners with an opportunity to avoid "rash" de-
cisions.
[N]either discourage cooperation and good-faith efforts
to resolve the difficult issues of finance and custody, nor ag-
gravate the tensions and hostile emotions that accompany
the breakup of a marriage.
[F]acilitate the development . . . of sound reorganized
family relationships.
[M]ake divorce equally available to people who, be-
cause of financial incapacity, are unable to meet counsel
and court costs or other expenses .... 46
B. The Indian Divorce Problem
As stated earlier, outwardly at least, poverty is the primary
problem of the Indian. Law in general and divorce law in particular
may be discriminatory as applied to the poor in that lack of financial
resources may deny them access to the courts. This requiring of
wealth for access to the judicial process is not only manifestly
unfair but also raises serious Constitutional questions under the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There exists on the Devils Lake Reservation a great many extra-
legal relationships and a high rate of illegitimacy. It has been
suggested that poverty and unrealistic divorce laws have combined
to bring this about.
4
7
Many couples on the reservation have created an informal family
relationship in which one or both of the individuals are validly
married to another and, because they cannot afford a divorce, are
unable to legalize their relationship by marriage. This situation may
even be a cause of family breakup. "In poor communities, estranged
spouses enter into relationships with third parties without obtaining
a dissolution of their marriage. When such relationships . .. become
common, the institution of marriage loses its sanctity in the eyes
of the community resulting in further family breakup." 48
C. Divorce Law Provisions
1. Abolition of Fault as Grounds for Divorce
The distinguishing feature of present divorce law is the notton
of "fault"-the matrimonial offense. The fault system requires that,
46. Goldstein and Gitter at 85.
4.7. Poster and Freed. Unequal Protection: Poverty and Family Law, 42 IND. L. J. 192,
193-94 (1966).
48. Hammer at 50.
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before a divorce is granted, one spouse be pronounced guilty and
the other innocent. The guilty is held responsible for the marriage
breakdown when in fact the offense has no actual relationship to the
cause of the breakdown.4
9
Although the goal of domestic law is to promote stable marriage
relationships, this is not to say that it should preserve marriages that
are marriages in name only by preventing their dissolution. The
state's interest is in the functional, viable, family relationship; others
do not serve the purpose that make a family worthy of the state's
protection.
50
The primary evil of the fault-based divorce procedure is that
it encourages the aggressive forces that may be already undermining
the family. The hatred caused by the accusations necessary to present
divorce proceedings is likely to destroy any possibility of conciliation
and divide the loyalty of the children. 51 Furthermore, by requiring
grounds for divorce, the law fails to afford relief where one spouse
who has been living apart from the other spouse and cohabiting
with a third party for a number of years wishes to legitimatize the
irregular union and the children of it but is prevented from doing
so by lack of grounds for a divorce.
Present divorce law, with its requirement of fault and the de-
fenses allowed, frequently denies divorce when one spouse objects.
If it is to be the state's policy that no marriage can be established
without the full and free consent of the parties, why should it not
also be the policy that no marriage must be maintained without the
full and free consent of husband and wife?
52
The decision as to whether the marriage is no longer functional
and whether dissolution is necessary can probably best be made
by the parties directly involved. Although the decision is a difficult
one and the parties may not be sufficiently objective, the abolition
of state-created excuses at least makes it clearer as to just what
the decision actually is. 53
If fault is not to be required, what evidences the point at which
the relationship is no longer functional and its preservation is no
longer in the interest of the state? A number of systems have been
suggested, from consent to incompatibility, to breakdown of the mar-
riage. 54 The ultimate in abolishing fault, of course, would be to permit
it upon consent of the parties. The primary objection to the con-
sensual principle is that it makes divorce a totally private under-
49. Foote, Levy and Sander at 177.
50. Goldstein and Gitter at 78-79.
51. Id. at 81.
52. Id. at 86.
53. Id. at 83-84.
54. In 1969 California adopted the Family Law Act which establishes grounds for
divorce as "irreconcilable differences leading to irremedial breakdown of the marriage."
WNSTS ANN. Cry. CODE § 4506(1).
NOTES
taking, completely ignoring the state's interest in the stability of
the marriage. The goal of divorce law should still be to minimize
state intervention, but not to exclude it entirely.
55
The "breakdown" approach under which divorce is granted if
the marriage is shown to have ceased to be a productive relationship,
probably has the most to recommend it; it is relatively easy to
determine objectively; it allows a certain amount of judicial latitude;
it is politically acceptable and it probably occurs closest to the point
at which the marriage actually ceases to be functional.
56
It has been argued that the abolition of fault and the point-of-
breakdown measurement would permit divorce too readily which
would lead to marital instability. However, "[t]he social, emotional,
religious forces which contribute to the monogamous ideal are simply
too strong, the marginal influence of the divorce law on individual
behavior too weak, to make it likely that easy divorce will increase




Although divorce consent alone would be too broad, giving the
court inadequate opportunity to protect the state's interest, there
must be some substitution of administrative for judicial process
whereby the procedure would be made less accusatorial and more
compatible with the absence of grounds. The California Governor's
Commission on the Family suggested that:
[T]he process be begun by the filing of a neutral pe-
tition.., instead of by the filing of an antagonistic complaint.
... This petition, filed by either spouse, would simply request
the court to inquire into the continuation of the marriage,
rather than setting forth specific grounds. .... 58
In view of the fact that under present divorce provisions it
is probably difficult for many couples to stop once the divorce
machinery has been started, even when they no longer want a
divorce, 59 the registration method of initiating divorce proceedings
could be followed by a number of safeguards by which the court
could also ensure adequate consideration of the state's interest in
the preservation of the marriage. These could include reports of
55. Levy at 59, quoting "Putting Asunder: A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society."
(The Report of a Group Appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, January. 1964)
para. 46-48.
56. Bee Levy at 90-97.
57. Id. at 92.
58. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, 17-18 (1966).
59. Levy at 122.
327
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
social service agencies,6 0 marriage counseling, 1 adjournment of
proceedings to permit further attempts at reconciliation, s2 privacy
of the proceedings,63 a delay or "cooling-off" period 4 and judicial
discretion in determining financial settlement and child custody.6 5
A modified divorce-by-application procedure, by reducing the
role of the attorney, would also be an important step toward solving
the problems of the poor. "[P]resent procedures are accessible
only to persons who are able to pay an attorney's fee. This fee,
especially in the case of an uncontested divorce, may be dispropor-
tionate to the minimal services rendered." 6
3. Marriage Counseling
As one of the procedural adjustments to the abolition of fault
as grounds for divorce, marriage counseling might prove to be
a valuable tool in reducing the incidence of marital dissolution. It
has been estimated that as many as one-half of the divorce cases
that are filed might be abandoned or dismissed if the couple were
enabled to receive counseling assistance.6 7 A number of the parties
to divorce proceedings are quite willing to give their marriage an-
other chance and are in need of counseling more than divorce.
8
A great many couples fail to appreciate' their marital respon-
sibilities or lack the understanding and ability to cope with the prob-
lems which most marriages normally experience. A scheme whereby
the court could discover which couples' marital difficulties could
be solved would allow for further counseling and possibly the saving
of the marriage.
Many divorcing couples who may be unable to volunteer to
reconcile will nonetheless respond to judicially initiated reconciliation
counseling.6 9 As a secondary effect, the counseling session may also
serve to promote more stable second marriages. Even if the mar-
iriage can't be saved, the counseling may calm the parties and im-
prove their post-divorce adjustment.
7 0
4. Delay in Granting Divorce Decree
Any registration application method of instituting divorce pro-
ceedings, even if modified to limit its consensual nature, should
60. See, e.g., Note, Terminating a Marriage in Nebraska, 43 NzB. L. liv. 156, 174
(1963).
01. See infra.
62. See, e.g., Levy at 122.
68. Id. at 117.
64. See fnfra.
65. See infra.
66. Hammer at 49.
67. Ralls, The King County Family Court, 28 WASH. L. REV. 22, 26 (1953).
68. McIntyre, Conciliation of Disrupted Marriages by or Through the Judiciary, 4 J.
I'AMTLY L. 117-18 (1964).
69. Levy at 122.
70. McIntyre, supra note 67, at 129.
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provide some safeguard to prevent hasty decisions. 1 Some required
lapse of time between the application and the decree would accom-
plish this, 72 and also provide the necessary time for investigation
into the conditions and circumstances surrounding the marriage,
marital counseling, and for agreement as to financial arrangements
and child custody. 8
5. Judicial Discretion in Financial Arrangements and Custody
Even when the parties to marriage agree in wanting a divorce,
quite frequently they are unable to agree as to how their property
will be divided or who shall have custody of the children. The lack
of agreement as to these matters should not be a bar to divorce
if divorce is truly necessary. The court is in a good position to decide,
as between the parties at least, what the agreement should be in
fairness to all.
The conditions of poverty that widely exist on the Devils Lake
Reservation, however, create special circumstances. Quite often
neither party to the divorce is in a position to adequately provide
for the children. In such cases the court should be empowered to
deny custody to both parents and make some other provision more
in the interest of the child's welfare.
The child's "best interests" has frequently been the guide for
judicial determination as to custody. The interests of the child of
course, should definitely be considered, but to preserve the "parental
right" notion, there should be required a specific finding of detriment
to the child in order to award custody to a non-parent."
The . . . courts have avoided the formulation of a clear-
cut definition of "unfitness" applicable to all guardianship
or custody cases, and it has been stated that the variable and
complex nature of human relationships and conduct renders
it impossible and undesireable. . .. 75
In line with this opinion it seems advisable to allow the court con-
siderable discretion in determination of custody.




The Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Court shall have authority to issue
marriage licenses to any Indian.
711. Levy at 58.
72. Note, OhattanoogG Divorce R~eport, 19 TmN. L. Rzv. 944 (1947).
73. Goldstein and Gitter at 91-92.
74. Bee J. Goldstein and J. Katz supra note 2, at 281-99.
75. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 259 A.C.A. 437, 442, 66 CAL. RzP=. 424, 427 (1968).
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(b) Tribal Custom Marriage Abolished
Marriages hereinafter entered into by Tribal custom shall not
be considered valid or legal.
(c) Recognition of Foreign Marriages
All marriages entered into outside of the Reservation, which
are valid according to the laws of the jurisdiction in which they
were contracted, shall be given full effect on the Reservation.
(d) Nature of Marriage
A marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract,
to which consent of parties capable of making it is necessary. Consent
alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by solem-
nization.
(e) Solemnization
A marriage may be properly solemnized by any recognized
clergyman or judge within the Devils Lake Sioux Reservation.
(f) Application for Marriage License
Any unmarried Indian, eligible by age and otherwise as here-
inafter defined, upon application to the Clerk of the Devils Lake
Sioux Tribal Court, may obtain a marriage license.
A license shall not be issued hereunder if either of the parties
have been previously divorced unless they provide the Clerk of Court
with a certified copy of the divorce decree.
(g) Age Requirements
Any unmarried male of the age of eighteen (18) years or more
and any unmarried female of the age of fifteen (15) years or more
and not otherwise disqualified is capable of consenting to and enter-
ing into a marriage.
Any males under twenty-one (21) years of age and females
under eighteen (18) years of age are to be considered minors, and
parental consent is required in order for them to be married. In
addition the couple must be given premarital counseling by a recog-
nized clergyman or member of the court.
The couple applying for a marriage license must obtain the
signature of a third party as to the truth of their stated ages.
Marriage of persons below the minimum age may be permitted
upon petition by the parents if it is shown that the couple exhibits
exceptional maturity and the circumstances are such that marriages
would be in their best interests.
Whenever a parent or guardian gives consent to the marriage
of a minor, he or she thereby assumes the responsibility in part
to provide for the minor and the children born until the minor be-
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comes of age. The assumption of this responsibility is to be stated
in a written consent.
(h) Waiting Period
There must intervene between the application for a license and
the issuing of the same not less than ten (10) days. During this time
the application must be publicly posted or otherwise published.
(i) Medical Examination
No application for a marriage license shall be accepted by the
Clerk of Court unless there has been filed with him a statement
signed by a licensed physician within the last 30 days that each ap-
plicant has been given an examination, including a standard sero-
logical test and that he is not infected with syphilis in a communi-
cable stage.
(j) Recording by Clerk of Court
A copy of the Certificate of Marriage must be returned by the
person solemnizing the marriage to the Clerk of Court. A record
must be kept by the Clerk of Court of all marriage licenses issued
and all certificates of marriage returned following solemnization.
(k) Incestuous Marriage Prohibited
Marriage between: parents and children of any degree, brothers
and sisters, uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews shall be void from
the beginning.
(1) Legitimacy
A child born before wedlock becomes legitimate by the subse-
quent marriage of its parents.
§3.2 Dissolution
(a) Jurisdiction
The Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Court shall have authority to
grant divorces, separations and annulments to any Indian whether
marriage was entered into under a marriage license issued by Clerk
of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Court or any other civil authority.
The court shall have authority to determine temporary custody
and support upon application for dissolution made hereunder while
such matter is pending.
(b) Procedure
The Chief Judge must approve all divorces, separations and
annulments granted hereunder.
The court may request a report from the Bureau of Indian
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Affairs regarding the parties and their children.
(c) Tribal Custom Divorce
Divorces under Tribal custom hereinafter shall not be considered
valid or legal.
(d) Termination of Marriage
Marriage is dissolved only by (a) the death of one of the parties
or (b) the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction decreeing
a dissolution of the marriage.
A. Divorce
(a) Application for Divorce
Any Indian married person or couple may file an Application
for Divorce with the Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Court.
In case only one spouse files an application hereunder, the other
spouse shall be given notice thereof by personal service as in §2.6 (c),
or if personal service fails, the court shall order such other notice
as is most likely to effect actual notice.
If within one year of the filing of an Application hereunder, no
Petition for Divorce has been made under subsection (b), the Appli-
cation shall cease to remain in force. The Application for Divorce
shall contain the names of the parties to the marriage, the date
and place of the marriage, the date and place of birth of each child
of the marriage, and the current residence of each party.
(b) Petition for Divorce
Ninety days after the filing of an Application for Divorce, either
or both spouses may petition the court for a Decree of Divorce.
If the court finds that the circumstances do not require it, the
90-day waiting period may be waived.
(c) Marital Counseling
Upon the filing of an Application for Divorce under subsection
(a), the court may require that they receive marriage counseling
from a person appointed by the court.
(d) Grounds for Divorce
Before the court may grant a Decree of Divorce there must be
a showing that there are irreconcilable differences between the
spouses which have caused the breakdown of the marriage.
(e) Irreconcilable Differences Defined
Irreconcilable differences are those grounds which are deter-
mined by the court to be substantial reasons for not continuing
NOTEs
the marriage and which make it appear that the marriage should
be dissolved.
Irreconcilable differences are evidenced by, but not limited to:
(1) desertion or living apart for a period exceeding 6 months, (2)
extreme cruelty, (3) habitual intemperance, (4) adultery.
(f) Continuation of Proceedings
If it appears that there is a reasonable possibility of reconcili-
ation, the court shall continue the proceedings for a period not to
exceed 30 days from the filing of the Petition. During the period of
the continuance there shall be made available to the parties an
opportunity for further marriage counseling.
(g) Financial and Custody Arrangements
Before the court can issue a Decree of Divorce there must be a
showing that the spouses have voluntarily reached reasonable finan-
cial agreement and custodial arrangements for their children. The
Decree shall include the terms of the spouses' agreement.
When the spouses do not reach agreement, or whenever only
one spouse makes application to the court, the court shall decide
the financial and custody issues.
Where it appears that neither spouse is suited to properly care
for the children, the court shall provide for the placing of the chil-
dren in a foster home.
Custody should be awarded in'the following order of preference:
(1) To either parent according to the best interests of the child,
but, other things being equal, custody shall be given to the
mother if the child is of tender years.
(2) To the person in whose home the child has been living in
a wholesome and stable environment.
(3) To any other person deemed by the court to be suitable
and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance
for the child.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person
other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it must
make a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detri-
mental to the child.
A custody order may be changed at any time upon a showing
by a party to the original action of a substantial change in circum-
stances.
(h) Effect of a Decree of Divorce
The Decree of Divorce shall restore to each of the spouses the
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status of being single and unmarried. However, the legitimacy of
children of the marriage is in no manner affected.
B. Separation
(a) Decree of Separation
A Decree of Separation may be obtained under the same circum-
stances and in the same manner as provided in §3.2A.
(b) Effect of Decree of Separation
The Decree of Separation is identical to the Decree of Divorce
in all respects except that the parties retain their married status.
(c) Divorce Following Separation
At any time not less than 90 days after a Decree of Separation
has been issued, either or both spouses may petition the court for
a Decree of Divorce. Terms of the Separation agreement shall be
incorporated into the Divorce Decree.
C. Annulment
(a) Grounds for Annulment
An action to declare a marriage null and void shall be the same
as for a Decree of Divorce or Separation except that no waiting
period need precede the Decree. The following marriages are void
and an action shall be maintainable for these reasons only:
(1) Incestuous marriage-Marriage between: Parents and chil-
dren of any degree, brothers and sisters, uncles and nieces, aunts
and nephews.
(2) Bigamous marriage-Where one of the spouses at the time
of the marriage is validly married to some other person.
(3) Non-age-By the spouse under the legal age for marriage.
Actions must be commenced not later than 6 months after the
spouse reaches legal age for marriage.
(b) Legitimacy
Children conceived before a Decree of Annulment are to be
considered legitimate in every respect.
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